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SOFTWARE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS AND PERFORMANCE 
OF SOFTWARE VENTURES IN CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
Abstract: This study examines the impact of entrepreneurs’ network structure and knowledge 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of their network members on product development, and revenue 
growth of software ventures in China and Russia. The empirical data are composed of structured 
interviews with 159 software entrepreneurs in Beijing and Moscow. The study found that 
structural holes and knowledge heterogeneity affect positively product diversity in interactive 
ways. The study also found that knowledge homogeneity accelerates product development. 
Product development speed enhances revenue growth in the long term. However, the 
combination of speed with dense and homogeneous networks harms revenue growth over time. 
The effects of structural holes and knowledge heterogeneity on product diversity and revenue 
growth over time are more salient in Russia due to the unique institutional, social, and cultural 
conditions present in the country. 
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A popular domain in entrepreneurship research examines new venture creation from the 
perspective of social network theory. Previous research found that the alliance of young 
companies with external actors affects perceived legitimacy, IPO and revenue growth of new 
ventures (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2001; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee, Lee & 
Pennings, 2001; Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). At the individual level, personal networks of 
entrepreneurs enable them to access equity and debt capital, and facilitate industry-wide network 
formation (Shane & Cable, 2002; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Uzzi, 1999). On the other hand, 
there is evidence that tightly controlled relationships reinforce social obligations and 
expectations that may limit freedom of entrepreneurs to exploit new opportunities, and 
encourage agents to seek rents (Uzzi, 1997). 
A fundamental assumption of the previous research on networks of entrepreneurs is that 
network structure operates autonomously of personal attributes of entrepreneurs as ego and 
his/her network members as alters. Ego is a focal actor who is connected to a set of people who 
are defined as alters. In the review of more than 70 papers on this topic, Hoang & Antoncic 
(2003) identified three structural and relational elements of networks that emerged as the key 
building blocks in models designed to explain entrepreneurial activity. They are relational 
content (e.g., access to information), network governance (e.g., trust), and network structure 
(e.g., centrality). Thus, there is a tendency to regard networks as separate and relatively 
autonomous entities that influence outcome variables independently of other factors. Networks 
themselves, however, do not “act” and do not “create” products and services. Players 
(individuals, organizations) act within the framework of existing networks that serve as the social 
and institutional contexts for actions of players (Burt, 1992). When individual players act, some 
social attributes, for example, gender and race, are likely to influence the existing patterns of 
network structure (Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992) and some attributes, for example, status and 
occupation, are likely to be influenced by the existing patterns of network structure (Burt, 1992). 
The connection between player and structure is a symmetric duality (Burt, 1992). This 
connection is a correlation rather than cause-effect because the link between actor attributes and 
network structure evolves and changes across populations and over time (Burt, 1992: 189). 
Outcomes of instrumental actions of players are likely to be influenced by network structure and 
actor attributes simultaneously due to the inherent player-structure duality.    4
Based on this conceptualization of the player-structure duality, I examine the interaction 
effects of entrepreneurs’ network structure and knowledge attributes of network alters on product 
development and revenue growth of software startups in China and Russia. On the one hand, I 
propose that dense and homogeneous networks of entrepreneurs lead to faster product 
development because of cooperative behavior, high trust, easy coordination and knowledge 
relatedness and integration inherent in these networks (Coleman, 1988). I posit that the effect of 
dense and homophilous networks on revenue growth is contingent upon product development 
speed. On the other hand, I suggest that sparse and heterogeneous networks of entrepreneurs 
facilitate greater product diversity because of diverse information sources, greater opportunities 
and resources, and different knowledge content found in such networks (Burt, 1992). I propose 
that the impact of low-density and heterophilous networks on revenue growth is dependent upon 
product diversity. Finally, I compare the way in which networks of Chinese and Russian 
software entrepreneurs influence product development and revenue growth over time. I argue 
that the different institutional and social environments in China and Russia contribute to the 
expected differences in networks that influence outcome variables.  
HYPOTHESES 
Networks, Knowledge, and Firm Performance 
I propose that dense networks of entrepreneurs accelerate product development when network 
ego and alters are homophilous in terms of knowledge. Cohesive networks accelerate product 
development because alters are motivated to collaborate, and interpersonal trust and cooperative 
norms facilitate frequent communication and coordination (Coleman, 1988). Social obligations, 
expectations, and commitment of members, enable entrepreneurs to complete multi-staged tasks 
of software development in tightly sequenced steps, and this may shorten waiting time 
(Coleman, 1988). For example, relational trust leads to early and rapid detection of faults, and 
hence to high efficiency programming. When network alters are strongly connected to each 
other, relationships are likely to be multiplex – information exchange, learning, and emotional 
caring do “co-exist” in each tie. Multiplex relationships facilitate flows of tacit knowledge that 
help to finish tasks in a timely fashion (Hansen, 1999). Another mechanism that speeds up 
design process is the explicit social pressure to accept views of network members, and the threat 
of sanctions for deviant ideas. This prevents the lengthy negotiations necessary for consensus-
making (Coleman, 1988).   5
Efficiency benefits of high-density networks are enhanced when they are combined with 
homogeneous knowledge of ego and alters. Homophily is the principle that an interaction 
between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin & Cook, 2001). Knowledge homophily reflected in similar worldviews, mental models, 
education, shared symbols and language, knowledge relatedness and perceived knowledge 
similarity, may accelerate the design process when alters have strong relationships (Hansen, 
2002; Ibarra, 1992; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). Knowledge commonality breeds cognitive trust 
between parties when alters meet each other frequently. Trustworthy and homophilous alters 
would facilitate efficient knowledge integration that solves design problems quickly (Okhuysen 
& Eisenhardt, 2002). For example, at various stages of software design, developers encounter 
different types of cognitive tasks, and knowledge uniformity synchronizes efforts at various 
phases. This decreases waiting time (Schach, 2002). An important benefit of dense and 
homophilous networks is fast decision-making. Mental consensus enables entrepreneurs to 
generate agreements promptly when they consider conflicting versions of module cohesion and 
coupling (Schach, 2002). Knowledge relatedness also promotes faster project completion 
because tacit knowledge is more easily transferred between people who know similar things and 
who have higher absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Hansen, 2002; Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003). Perceived similarity in knowledge promotes unconstrained exchanges between 
network alters because they experience less fear of revealing embarrassing gap and less 
intellectual pressure from alters (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). High-density and homophilous 
networks enable entrepreneurs to be fast in product development because of communication, 
coordination, social obligation, cognitive trust, knowledge integration, and fast decision-making 
benefits found in these networks. Based on this logic, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: Network density is associated negatively with product development 
duration, when network members are homogeneous. 
 
While dense and homogeneous networks speed up products to market, sparse (rich in 
structural holes) and heterogeneous networks lead to greater product diversity. Sparse networks 
are the networks where alters are weakly connected or disconnected among themselves. A distant 
relationship or absence of relationship between two alters is called “structural hole”. A structural 
hole is a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts (Burt, 1992). A structural hole is a   6
universal phenomenon observable in all human networks including American, Chinese, and 
French managerial networks (Burt, Hogarth & Michaud, 2000; Tsui, Farh & Xin, 2002). 
Structural holes facilitate product diversity through several mechanisms: timely access to 
nonredundant information and referral sources, the discovery of new opportunities and resources 
in distant clusters, brokerage of knowledge and technology, and the transitivity mechanism when 
the ego connects directly two previously unconnected ties (Burt, 1992; Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997; Granovetter, 1983). 
Access to nonredundant information sources exposes entrepreneurs to diverse technological, 
product design and market information located in socially and geographically distant network 
clusters (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Software entrepreneurs learn from bridging ties what 
applications are demanded and favored in different market niches, and what modules, functions, 
design features, algorithms and languages are combined and used in what ways to produce 
various applications in technically novel yet cost efficient ways. Third-party referrals help 
entrepreneurs to access greater pools of actor that generate greater amount of information 
(Fernandez, Castilla & Moore, 2000). Referees as information filters reduce search and 
deployment cost of information gathering in global networks (Burt, 1992). The matching 
principle in referral practices helps entrepreneurs to access the right codes and design elements at 
the right time to fill in the missing gaps in software production (Fernandez et al, 2000). Through 
low-density networks, entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities to form external alliances 
and embed their programs in hardware and middleware systems of other players (Lee et al, 
2001). Entrepreneurs-knowledge brokers who spin boundaries of fragmented domains of ideas, 
artifacts and people, facilitate product diversification through bridging that exposes 
entrepreneurs to local resources, learning that obtains new knowledge, and linking that 
recognizes how knowledge, learned in one context, could be valuable in others (Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997). Network transitivity may be beneficial to product design. Transitivity is a property 
that considers patterns of triples of actors in a network. A relation is transitive if every time AB 
relation and AC relation leads to BC relation (Granovetter, 1983). Transitive property enables 
actors to bring together two autonomous alters to create products. New products are the results of 
linking of previously disconnected players and filling in the structural hole between them. This is 
different from brokerage where the ego gains by playing two actors off against one another, 
draws value from intermediation and keeps sides apart (Burt, 1992).   7
The research literature suggests that there are three factors that indicate actor’s knowledge 
diversity: experience, education, and perceived knowledge diversity (Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). The 
networks rich in structural holes are likely to be comprised of heterogeneous alters (Marsden, 
1990). Knowledge heterophily, defined as the extent to which alters possess different knowledge 
in terms of content, is expected to influence the causal relationship between structural holes and 
product diversification. 
Different industry knowledge of alters help entrepreneurs customize their products 
according to the industry specifics. Diverse functional experience affects outcome variables 
positively because it generates constructive conflict (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Cross-
industry experience also increases product variety, because designers “cross-pollinate” their 
ideas between products and industries (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  
Laboratory experiments found that groups composed of heterogeneous members in terms of 
education generated both greater number of ideas and greater number of different categories of 
ideas than homogeneous groups (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). Network members who studied 
different science and art disciplines have complementary knowledge that is used in the designing 
of various elements of software. While a mathematician writes algorithms, an artist designs 
architecture, and a consumer psychologist aims to enhance the user-friendliness of products. 
Effective developers often re-configure old modules and reuse codes to create “new” products. 
Marketing experts strive to make these products appear new and different. The perception that 
each contact has a different expertise to contribute may facilitate idea flows, because alters are 
more willing to listen to “expert” views (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). These are reflected in the 
greater number of product ideas. Building on the reasoning, I posit that: 
Hypothesis 2: Structural holes are associated positively with product diversity, when 
network members are heterogeneous. 
 
At early stages of a venture life cycle, high-density and homophilous networks may generate 
greater revenues when product development time is shorter because easy coordination, 
communication, and unconstrained knowledge-sharing among alters helps the entrepreneur to be 
among the first who deliver unique products to the market. First movers may capitalize on the 
growing demand for certain types of software products. Because of the emergent nature of the   8
industry markets for specific applications are likely to be fragmented (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). Therefore, customers have few alternatives, and are not able to judge 
product quality. This may provide a temporary advantage to those who are efficient in 
coordination, decision-making and product development. However, this advantage is likely to 
fade over time, causing revenue decline for three reasons: narrow product range, poor quality and 
limited functionality as the result of simple technology (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). As 
demand for certain applications matures, numerous firms will compete for a market share. Firms 
that supply varieties of software applications are likely to bundle different products together, and 
offer complex software solutions at lowered costs. This trend pressures those firms that have 
only a limited number of products to bundle together. 
Software development is a prolonged series of activities, from design and refining to testing 
and insuring reliability. Therefore, efficiency sometimes may jeopardize application quality, 
reliability and functionality (Coleman & Verbruggen, 1998). As customers use first-to-market 
products, they may encounter design faults, and demand applications of greater functionality and 
better quality. This affects negatively the revenues of those firms that supply inferior products in 
terms of quality and functionality. In this way, sticking to the same contacts and preserving a 
high-efficiency culture that generated temporary advantages may turn into a liability, because 
tight and homogeneous networks restrict entrepreneurs’ access to new information, opportunities 
and resources, and blind time-chasing may compromise product quality and functionality. Based 
on this logic, I suggest that: 
Hypothesis 3: At early stages, dense and homogeneous networks are associated 
positively with revenue growth when product development is speedy. The positive 
interaction effects of density, homophily and product development speed on revenue 
growth are likely to decline over time. 
 
Low-density and heterogeneous networks coupled with product diversity enable 
entrepreneurs to sell simultaneously a wide range of applications in several different market 
niches overlooked by other firms. Greater information, knowledge resources and flexibility 
embedded in such networks allow entrepreneurs to combine various elements of software in new 
ways to create complex products. Having many different modules and design samples helps   9
developers to deliver varieties of products at low cost (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). These factors 
facilitate gradual revenue growth. 
The previous research on the main and moderating effects of product diversity on 
performance of large corporations in the Western context reported positive relationships between 
product diversity and performance (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997; Tallman & Li, 1996) although 
overall evidence remains inconclusive (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Moesel, 1993). The firms 
that diversify their product offerings have greater capabilities, and learn from diversification 
efforts (Hitt et al, 1997). Broader product strategy achieves synergies (Tallman & Li, 1996). 
As ventures develop, entrepreneurs learn to communicate with alters who do not know each 
other and who are different in their education and knowledge. The initial disadvantages of 
having incoherent networks and broader product scope may turn into assets. As firms grow, they 
must identify new revenue opportunities and satisfy customers whose needs are dynamic. The 
networks rich in structural holes and composed of heterogeneous members generate sustainable 
opportunities. Based on this reasoning, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 4: At growth stages, sparse and heterogeneous networks are associated 
positively with revenue growth, when product diversity is greater. The positive 
interaction effects of structural holes, heterophily and product diversity on revenue 
growth are likely to grow over time. 
 
China versus Russia 
It is assumed that the effects of network structure and knowledge composition on outcome 
variables vary across countries contingent upon context. Two environmental factors influence the 
way in which entrepreneurs network in the two countries: institutional evolution and social 
mobility. The Russian reforms resulted in the destruction of existing institutions and networks 
(Hitt et al, 2004). This forced actors, including entrepreneurs, to create new networks and 
clusters (Kharkhordin & Gerber, 1994; Sedaitis, 1998). In contrast, the institutional status quo in 
China enabled actors, including entrepreneurs, to preserve their guanxi networks intact over time 
(Yang, 1994). Arguably, Russian society is more mobile both horizontally and vertically because 
of the more liberalized labor market and elimination of the household registration system – 
propiska, and this facilitates entrepreneurial mobility. The Chinese labor market is becoming 
flexible, although rigidities remain because of the household registration system – houkou that 
constrains flows of people, ideas and resources (Bian, 1997).   10
The Chinese networks are denser and more homogeneous, and this is reflected in shorter 
waiting times to product shipment. The Chinese networks are composed of more family 
members, schoolmates and close friends due to the prevalent role of guanxi base – propensity to 
form relationships based on common background, e.g., ancestral origin and classmate (Farh, 
Tsui, Xin & Cheng, 1998; Tsui, Farh & Xin, 2000). Ethnographic and survey evidence on 
networks of urban residents and entrepreneurs are consistent with this claim (Bian, 1997; Yang, 
1994). The Chinese are strongly inclined to categorize people as belonging to in and out groups, 
and members of in-groups are expected to fulfill their role obligations and demonstrate group 
solidarity (Farh et al, 1998). Interpersonal trust is higher in China because there are sophisticated 
social devices of detecting and sanctioning opportunistic behavior, e.g., saving and losing face. 
The institutional stability prevalent in China provides favorable conditions for relative 
trustworthy behavior of actors (Hitt et all, 2004). Social relationships are intensely personalized, 
and in this way, the guanxi ties are more multiplex. For example, boundaries between the 
personal and the professional networks in China are blurred. These features make the Chinese 
networks cohesive. 
Knowledge homophily in guanxi networks is greater because many network members are 
classmates who studied the same subjects (Farh et al, 1998). Homophily as a selection 
mechanism favors those who are similar in their worldviews since the social and geographic 
distances restrict contact search and tie formation (McPherson et al, 2001). The strong in-group 
pressure and intense guanxi communication homogenizes ideas of members of a particular 
guanxi clique over time (Lin, 2001). Skillful consensus-making and willingness to accommodate 
each other’s opinions promotes greater perceived intellectual similarity in the Chinese guanxi. 
Coordination, trust, knowledge integration and other efficiency benefits will be especially salient 
in China. 
The interaction effects of density, homophily and product development speed on revenue 
growth of the Chinese firms will decline at a greater pace over time for a number of reasons. The 
revenue growth is greater at early stages, due to the relative efficiency. This rate, however, is 
unsustainable because of fewer resources and opportunities found in overlapping networks. 
Strong  guanxi ties re-enforce normative expectations of alters to stick to the same old ties 
forever, and this places boundaries on identifying and exploiting potential opportunities and 
gaining access to resources necessary to exploit them (Tsui et al, 2002). Unlike in Russia,   11
brokerage in China is perceived as exploitative, and therefore, entrepreneurs are constrained to 
generate rents from arbitrage. Since the Chinese triads are more transitive because of the 
relational strength and trust, guanxi networks become even more redundant and homogeneous 
over time (Granovetter, 1983). Such networks harm revenue growth in the long term. Therefore, 
I propose that:  
Hypothesis 5: The interaction effects of density and homophily on product development 
duration are greater for the Chinese firms. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The decline in the interaction effects of density, homophily and product 
development speed on revenue growth over time is greater for the Chinese firms. 
 
In sharp contrast to the Chinese guanxi, the Russian svyazi networks contain greater 
numbers of structural holes and are composed of heterogeneous members with regard to their 
knowledge (Sedaitis, 1998). Relational base as a networking rule is not as prevalent as it is in 
China and therefore, contact recruitment is less path-dependent and more spontaneous. The 
internal hierarchy in the Russian networks is based on power and status, and this generates 
greater relational distance among alters (Kharkhordin & Gerber, 1994). Social sanctions used to 
punish deviant behavior are less severe and effective in Russia, and therefore, alters have greater 
autonomies in their networking behavior (Ledeneva, 1998). The Russian triads are less transitive 
because there is less trust embedded in triads (Petrovskii, 1991). Social reciprocity is less 
universal and often ignored in relationships. This is in a sharp contrast to the Chinese guanxi, 
which contains renching – a well-articulated set of expectations and exchange norms. Brokerage 
is more accepted, and therefore, the Russian brokers are likely to draw greater values from their 
intermediate positions (Burt, 1992). There are fewer constraining rituals and norms in the 
Russian networks, and this provides greater freedoms to act upon spotted opportunities in 
networks.  
The Russians have greater opportunities for networking with people of diverse experience 
and education, because the education system and labor market are more liberalized. There is no 
dominant networking principle, e.g., guanxi base in China, that structures personal networks, and 
therefore, the svyazi networks are composed of alters who differ in their ascribed and achieved 
attributes (Ledeneva, 1994). Because of the less in-group cognitive pressure to internalize and 
accept views of other alters, the mindsets of Russian alters are less homogenized over time. In 
the contrast to the harmony-loving Chinese, the Russians are more expressive in relationships   12
and do not mind conflicts, and therefore, there is a greater perception of opinion diversity in the 
Russian networks. 
The growth rate of the Russian ventures is lower initially due to the difficulties of resource 
mobilization in incoherent and relatively isolated networks (Sedaitis, 1998). Therefore, there is 
greater room for revenue growth over time. Structural holes generate continuous opportunities 
because they enable entrepreneurs to reach actors in global networks in a timely manner at low 
cost (Sedaitis, 1998). Once the Russian entrepreneurs learn how to draw values from arbitrage 
opportunities, they are likely maximize the number of holes in their networks. Since the Russian 
triads are less transitive, the network redundancy rate is lower, and such networks preserve a 
balance between structural holes and strong ties among alters over time. Building effective 
networks that are resource-rich and nonredundant is likely to facilitate venture performance over 
time. All these features will be reflected in the performance of Russian ventures. I propose that: 
Hypothesis 7: The interaction effects of structural holes and heterophily on product 
diversity are greater for the Russian firms. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The growth in the interaction effects of structural holes, heterophily and 
product diversity on revenue growth over time is greater for the Russian firms. 
 
METHODS 
Contexts 
The Chinese software industry. The roots of software firms in China are traced to four 
sources: research institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, university research laboratories, 
R&D institutes of government ministries, and entrepreneurial startups (Tschang & Lan, 2003). 
The total sales of software and system integration products in 2003 were worth US$19.3 billion, 
a 45 percent growth year-on-year. Domestic software vendors command 30 percent share of the 
country’s software market. By the end of 2003, there were 8582 domestic software vendors 
(People’s Daily, 2004a). Roughly 70 percent of these firms are small firms that employ fewer 
than 50 full-time employees (Tschang & Lan, 2003). China’s software exports reached $3.6 
billion in 2002 (Business Weekly, 2003). A recent study reports that the Chinese vendors focus 
on the domestic market and emphasize software products more than services (Tschang & Lan, 
2003).  
The Russian software industry. In contrast to China, the Russian software industry is 
older and smaller. The information technology industry was worth $3 billion in 2001, and one-  13
third of this is software sector (ARIASYS, 2002). In terms of origin, Russian software ventures 
resemble the Chinese firms, with two important differences. Like the Chinese vendors, many 
originated in the Soviet/Russian Academy of Sciences, university laboratories, and government 
R&D institutions. Thanks to the Soviet government’s heavy investment in the arms industry, 
Russia inherited advanced software technologies used in the space and weaponry industries. 
Many successful software firms are spin-offs from the Russian military-industrial complex, 
which still produces advanced weaponry systems, including software. A major difference 
between Russia and China is that most Russian vendors are private startup firms. At the end of 
2002, there were more than 2000 domestic software companies (AMR Research, 2002). The 
average revenue growth of software makers was 50-60 percent in 2002 (Ekspert, 2003). Most 
Russian firms are small, employing fewer than 45 people and generating revenues about $2.5 
million a year. 
Sample and Data Collection 
The data are composed of structured telephone interviews with 159 software entrepreneurs in 
Beijing and Moscow. Some 82 Russian entrepreneurs were interviewed in June-August 2003, 
and 77 Chinese entrepreneurs were interviewed in September-October 2003. In total, 118 
respondents were CEOs, and 41 respondents were chief technology officers (CTO). The 
technical directors were interviewed only in those occasions when the CEO was unavailable and 
the firm has more than 50 full-time employees. I used three criteria to sample new, dedicated and 
domestic software ventures. First, venture must be 6 years old or younger at the time of survey 
(Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000). Second, firm should be registered as a software firm. Third, 
venture should be owned fully by domestic shareholders. 
Using different information sources, my research assistants and I created a list of 111 
new, dedicated and domestic ventures based in Moscow. The positive response rate for the 
Russian sample is 74 percent. In Beijing, we created a list of 172 ventures. The positive response 
rate for the Chinese sample is 45 percent. I conducted the ANOVA tests on firm age and 
Zhongguancun location (the high tech district in Western Beijing) between the two samples, and 
found that younger firms were more likely to decline. I carried out 14 in-depth interviews with 
four Russian and three Chinese entrepreneurs prior surveys. 
  The questionnaire was designed in English. Teams of Chinese and Russian management 
professors translated the questionnaire into Chinese and Russian. The back translation and   14
checking was performed by different Chinese and Russian management professors who earned 
doctorates from North American universities. I pre-tested the questionnaire with three Russian 
and two Chinese entrepreneurs. Two research assistants and I conducted interviews in Moscow, 
and the team of six research assistants carried out interviews in Beijing. We sent questionnaires 
in advance by fax and email, so that respondents would have them during interviews. Each 
interview lasted approximately in 30 minutes.   
Measures 
Independent variables. Network data were collected by the standard method of name 
generators and name interpreters (Burt, 1992; Marsden, 1990). The questionnaire contained one 
name generator and three name interpreters. The name generator is: “The next questions are 
about those with whom you often discuss issues related to software programming and design. 
Please name those persons with whom you have discussed software programming issues over the 
last six months”. This question generated maximum 8 names. The network content is the 
discussion network about software programming and design (Burt, 2004). Three name 
interpreters were relational duration between ego and alters measured in years (how long do you 
know the contact), alter education (BA degree in engineering, science and arts/humanities), and 
whether alter is a full-time employee of the firm (yes and no). The question that captured 
network structure is described below.
2  Network density is measured as the percentage of 
“especially close” relationships within the total number of possible relationships among alters 
(Marsden, 1990). Structural holes is measured as the number of “distant” relationships among 
alters (Burt, 1992, 2004). Network size is the number of contacts named. Relationship duration 
measures the tie strength between ego and alters and it is the sum of years ego knows all alters 
divided by the number of alters (Marsden, 1990). Internal ties captures the percentage of alters 
who are full-time employees of the firm. Knowledge homophily and heterophily were captured 
by education homophily and heterophily, and perceived knowledge homophily and heterophily. 
                                                 
2 “The next question is to describe the strength of relations between listed people. You do this by circling codes in 
the matrix below. This is a complex question, but it is essential to measuring of social networks – and answering the 
question is a simple task when taken one column at a time. Begin with the first person listed. Relations with the first 
person are listed in the third column. Indicate his or her relationship with the person in each row in one of three 
ways: Circle E if there is an especially close relation between the row person and the first person. Circle D if the row 
person and first person are distant in the sense that they are rarely work together, are total strangers as far as you 
know, or do not enjoy one another’s company. Leave E D blank to indicate that two people are neither distant nor 
especially close” (Burt 1992; 2000; 2003). 
   15
Education heterophily was measured by the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) (Agresti & 
Agresti, 1978).
3 Since I measure the extent to which alters differ in their education content, I 
used this measurement. This is consistent with the previous network research in the Western 
context (Marsden, 1987) and research on network diversity of Russian entrepreneurs (Sedaitis, 
1998). The IQV indicates the dispersion of the alters over three nominal categories of education, 
i.e., engineering, science and arts/humanities (Sedaitis, 1998). Education homophily is measured 
as the inverse of the IQV. For example, if education heterophily is .45, education homophily is 
.55. This variable indicates the extent to which alters are similar in their education content. 
Perceived homophily is the scale comprised of two questions: “My way of thinking about 
software programming and design is similar to ways of thinking of those with whom I discuss 
ideas about software development”; “I always come up with similar ideas about software 
programming with those with whom I discuss ideas about software development”. Distribution 
values of each question were five-point Likert scale items ranging from strongly agree (5) to 
strongly disagree (1). I computed the scale by adding up the values in each item and dividing 
them by two. Perceived  heterophily is the inverse of perceived homophily. For example, if 
perceived homophily score is 3, then perceived heterophily score is 2. 
Dependent variables. Product diversity is the number of market segments where the firm 
sold packaged software products and applications. The respondents were given a list of 14 
market segments of packaged software, and were asked to indicate in which segments the firm 
sold packaged software and when. I measure packaged software products because they are 
standardized and clearly classified into groups whereas customized products and services are 
idiosyncratic depending on the need of the particular customer. Fourteen product market 
segments are finance/accounting software, general management, enterprise planning, customer 
relationship, supply chain, e-government, systems software, learning/education, middleware, 
embedded software, database, general office, home software, and others (e.g., medical, 
geographical, games, anti-virus, industrial, etc). I used software product classifications of the 
Chinese Software Industry Association, the China Software Union, the Russian National 
Software Development Association, the Russian Anti-software Piracy Association, and 
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published reports (Business weekly, 2003; Ekspert, 2003). These sources generated 11 
overlapping product segments in two countries, and 3 non-overlapping segments were added to 
the list. This classification is consistent with the previous research on the Chinese software 
industry (Tschang & Lan 2003). The information suggests that software product markets are 
comparable in two countries. I do not use the entropy measure of product diversification because 
during the pilot interviews I found out that it is virtually impossible to obtain reliable sales 
figures by segment (Hitt et al, 1997; Zahra et al, 2000). Furthermore, I follow the suggestion of 
Hoskisson et al (1993) that in process studies that examine the underlying managerial rationale 
and strategy, subjective measurements of product diversification might be more appropriate since 
objective and subjective measurements tend to be highly correlated. In addition, similar 
measurements (product market count) were used in the previous studies of entrepreneurial firms 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990).  
Product development duration is the average number of months from the month and year of 
founding (birth) until the month and year of first shipment of all products in different market 
segments for revenues. For example, firm B was founded in August 1999, and three different 
packaged software products were shipped for revenues first time in May 2000, December 2000, 
and July 2001 accordingly. The total waiting time for three products is 48 months (9+16+23). I 
divided this sum by three and the result is 16 months. This number is product development 
duration. Only 3 firms out of 159 ventures had more than one product in any of the fourteen 
market segments, and I excluded these exceptional cases from the analysis. Schoonhoven, 
Eisenhardt & Lyman (1990) used a similar measurement (month count from the founding date) 
for waiting time to first shipment. Product development speed is measured as the difference 
between the mean product development duration and the product development duration of each 
venture.  
Revenue growth was measured as the difference between sales in two consecutive years 
divided by sales one year earlier, with the quotient multiplied by 100 (Zahra et al, 2000). The 
respondents were given a table where the year 1999, the year 2000, the year 2001, and the year 
2002 were listed. The interviewees were asked to calculate revenue growth in percentage for 
each year from the previous year. Revenue year two is the percentage growth in sales in the 
second year of revenue generation. It can be 1999, 2000, 2001, or 2002 depending on when the 
firm generated first revenues. Revenue year three is the percentage growth in sales in the third   17
year of revenue generation. Revenue year four is the percentage growth in sales in the fourth year 
of revenue generation. Revenue year five is the percentage growth in sales in the fifth year of 
revenue generation. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1990) used a similar yearly differentiation of 
revenue growth of new semiconductor firms. 
Control variables. Firm age is the number of years a venture had been in existence (Zahra et 
al, 2000). Firm size is measured by the number of full-time employees at the time of survey. 
Venture capital is a binary variable of one if private equity was raised and zero otherwise 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Ownership is a binary variable of one if the major 
shareholder is the respondent and zero otherwise (Zahra et al, 2000). China dummy was included 
in the regressions of the total sample, while Russia dummy is the reference group. 
Data and construct validity. Measurements for network size, density, structural holes, 
relationship duration, and internal ties are externally valid because the name generator method 
has been proved as valid and reliable (Burt, 1992; 2004; Marsden, 1990). 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) for the perceived homophily is 0.82. I 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement model associated with Likert scale 
items to assess how well the interview questions load onto the constructs. I found that the 
comparative fit index is 0.79, the incremental fit index is 0.84, and the root mean squared error 
of approximation is 0.071. The findings suggest that the measurement is valid and reliable. 
  In order to check common methods bias and social desirability bias, we carried out data 
cross-validation phone calls. During the interviews, we asked for phone numbers of one of the 
contacts listed. In all, 41 Chinese respondents and 28 Russian respondents provided phone 
numbers. By selecting every second on the list of 41 Chinese contacts, and every second and 
third on the list of 28 Russian contacts, we contacted 20 Chinese and 20 Russian alters and asked 
several questions. We asked whether the contact’s BA education was in engineering, science, 
and arts/humanities. The answers of 19 (95%) Chinese alters and the answers of 18 (90%) 
Russian contacts were consistent with our data collected from the respondents. Therefore, 
education homophily and heterophily measurements are valid. We asked each contact to describe 
her/his relationship with the person next on the list in terms of “especially close”, “distant” and 
“neither especially close nor distant”. All 20 (100%) Chinese answers and 17 (85%) Russian 
answers matched up our findings. This indicates that the measurements for network density and 
structural holes are valid. To my knowledge, this study is the only study that validated   18
perceptions of the ego of relationships among alters by asking one alter to characterize her 
relationship with another alter. To cross-validate the perceptual homophily items, we asked two 
questions: “My way of thinking about software programming and design is similar to the way of 
thinking of (Ego)”; “We (Ego and I) always come up with similar ideas about software 
programming”. The answers of 17 (85%) Chinese contacts and the answers of 15 (75%) Russian 
alters were consistent with our findings. The homophily items are valid. 
  In order to validate revenue growth data, we approached the Chinese and Russian 
government departments for information. We created lists of 15 firms in two countries with their 
2002 revenue growth data, and we submitted this information to the Department of Taxation of 
the Haidian district government in Beijing, and the Department of Taxation of the Moscow City 
Government in Russia. The Chinese and Russian experts directed me to these departments as the 
organizations that possess accounting information of firms. The formal requests were made on 
the behalf of Peking University and the Academy of National Economy in Moscow. We asked 
the authorities to confirm whether our information were consistent with their data. After many 
phone calls and faxes, we received confirmatory results. The revenue information of 12 (80%) 
Chinese ventures and 11 (73%) Russian firms have been confirmed to be accurate. Although I do 
not have hard accounting information, this confirmation indicates the validity and reliability of 
the revenue data. Two trained research assistants who were not members of the interview teams 
conducted validation interviews in Beijing and Moscow. This study is a cross-level study in 
terms of unit of analysis. Predictor variables are measured at individual level but dependent 
variables are measured at organizational level. Such research strategies are acceptable as long as 
measurements and constructs are valid internally and externally. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations for all variables of the 
total sample (N=159). Since network size and internal ties were significantly correlated with 
network density and structural holes, I did not include these variables in the regression analysis. 
Table 1 reveals that the mean firm age is 3.33 years (S.D.=1.44) and the mean relationship 
duration is 4.92 years (S.D.=3.53). This indicates that the entrepreneurs knew most alters before 
they started their ventures. I excluded the relationship duration variable in the regression analysis 
because it did not have any meaningful relationships with predictor and outcome variables. Table   19
2 reports the means, standard deviations, and the ANOVA results of the Chinese and the Russian 
samples. It shows that two samples significantly differ from each other in all variables except 
perceived homophily, perceived heterophily and revenue year five. The Chinese networks are 
smaller, denser, contain fewer structural holes, and composed of more internal ties and 
homogeneous alters. The Chinese ventures are younger, larger, more likely to raise private 
equity, and faster in product development yet have narrow product range. In general, the Chinese 
ventures have higher accumulated revenue growth. In contrast to Russia, fewer software ventures 
in China are owned by the entrepreneur. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Networks, Knowledge and Firm Performance 
In Table 3, I present the results of the linear regression analysis predicting product development. 
Model 1 examines the main effects of network density, education homophily, and perceived 
homophily on product development duration. The model is significant (F=11.38). The model 
reveals that education homophily and perceived homophily have significant negative effects on 
product development duration. Model 2 examines the interaction effects of network density, 
education homophily and perceived homophily on product development duration. The model is 
significant (F=10.22). The model finds that the interaction effects of density and homophily 
variables are not significant while education homophily and perceived homophily have the main 
negative effects on product development duration. Hypothesis 1 that predicted negative 
interaction effects of network density and knowledge homophily on product development 
duration has not been confirmed. 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
  Model 3 examines the main effects of structural holes, education heterophily, and 
perceived heterophily on product diversity. The model is significant (F=14.03). The model 
shows that structural holes, education heterophily and perceived heterophily have positive main 
effects on product diversity. Model 4 shows the positive and significant interaction effects of 
structural holes, education and perceived heterophily on product diversity. The model is 
significant (F=17.19). Hypothesis 2 that expected positive interaction effects of structural holes 
and knowledge heterogeneity on product diversification is supported. 
  Table 4 reports the results of the linear regression analysis predicting revenue growth. 
Models 1-3 report insignificant interaction effects of density, education homophily, perceived   20
homophily and product development speed on revenue growth in the year two, three and four. 
Model 1 (F=3.09) and Model 2 (F=3.10) are significant. Model 4 indicates that the interaction 
effects on revenue growth in the year five are significant and negative. The model is significant 
(F=2.23). Hypothesis 3 that proposed positive effects of dense and homophilous networks on 
revenue growth when product development is speedy at early stages, and that predicted decline 
of positive effects over time is partially supported.  Models 5-8 show insignificant interaction 
effects of structural holes, education heterophily, perceived heterophily and product diversity on 
revenue growth in the year two, three, four and five. Hypothesis 4 that predicted positive and 
sustainable effects of holes, heterophily and product diversity on sales is not supported. 
In Table 5, I present the results of the regression analysis predicting product development 
of the Chinese and Russian software ventures. Model 1 reports that the interaction effects of 
network density, education homophily and perceived homophily on product development 
duration of the Chinese ventures are not significant. The model is significant (F=2.2). Model 2 
reveals the non-significant interaction effects of network density, education homophily, and 
perceived homophily on product development duration of the Russian ventures. The model is 
significant (F=6.37). Hypothesis 5 that predicted greater interaction effects of density and 
homophily for the Chinese firms is not supported. Model 3 finds that the interaction effects of 
structural holes, education heterophily, and perceived heterophily on product diversity of the 
Chinese ventures are not significant. The model is not significant. Model 4 reports the significant 
positive interaction effects of structural holes, education heterophily and perceived heterophily 
on product diversity of the Russian ventures. The model is significant (F=5.66). Hypothesis 7 
that proposed greater interaction effects of structural holes and heterophily for the Russian firms 
is supported. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
  Table 6 demonstrates the results of the linear regression analysis predicting revenue 
growth of the Chinese and Russian firms. I did not perform regression analysis in the year 4 and 
5 for the Chinese ventures because the sample size drops below 20 (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 
1990). Models 1-5 suggest that the interaction effects of network density, education homophily, 
perceived homophily and product development speed on revenue growth of the Chinese and 
Russian ventures over three years are not significant. Model 1 (F=2.02) and Model 2 (F=2.66) 
are significant. Models 3-5 are not significant. Model 6 reveals the significant negative   21
interaction effects of the network density, education homophily, perceived homophily, and 
product development speed on revenue growth in the year five of the Russian ventures. The 
model is significant (F=2.7). Hypothesis 6 that predicted greater declines in the interaction 
effects of density, homophily, and product development is greater for the Chinese firms is not 
supported. Models 7 and 9 show that the interaction effects of structural holes, education 
heterophily, perceived heterophily and product diversity on revenue growth of the Chinese 
ventures over three years are not significant. The models are not significant. Model 8 finds that 
the interaction effects of structural holes, education heterophily, perceived heterophily and 
product diversity on revenue growth of the Russian firms in the year two are negative and 
significant. The model is significant (F=3.4). Model 12 reveals the significant positive 
interaction effects of structural holes, education heterophily, perceived heterophily and product 
diversity on revenue growth of the Russian ventures in the year five. The model is significant 
(F=3).  Hypothesis 8 that proposed growth in the interaction effects of structural holes, 
heterophily, and product diversity for the Russian firms over time is supported. 
DISCUSSION 
Education homophily and perceived homophily accelerate product shipment independent of 
network density, and their effects become greater once the interactions are controlled. 
Knowledge homophily shortens product development cycles through efficient knowledge 
utilization, cognitive trust, and faster design decisions. Education overlap enables entrepreneurs 
to know who knows what, and this knowing reduces search time to find appropriate software 
components. Cognitive trust reflected in shared meanings creates a sense of certainty and 
confidence. Confident entrepreneurs are likely to move faster because they are optimistic about 
outcomes. Having discussion networks characterized by the absence of conflicting disagreements 
helps entrepreneurs to make speedy decisions when they integrate numerous ingredients to create 
applications. When entrepreneurs create simpler products rapidly, unconstrained exchanges 
without psychological blocking seem more effective (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). The ideational 
commonality promotes efficiency. 
The simultaneous exploitation of structural holes and diverse knowledge enables 
entrepreneurs to create new products from novel ingredients that did not exist before (e.g., new 
module), produce different applications from existing technologies through recombination and 
reuse, and sell similar products in different market segments by re-packaging and re-branding.   22
Network members who have complementary knowledge help entrepreneurs to define a relative 
value of new information for product development. Different specialized knowledge of alters 
enhances entrepreneurs’ alertness to recognize and exploit new opportunities in global networks. 
Socializing with people who are disconnected and know different things is likely to generate 
greater benefits from third-party referrals because it helps the entrepreneur to identify what 
resources she should seek from whom, when and how (Shane & Cable, 2002). When the 
entrepreneur penetrates distant network clusters, alters with heterogeneous experience would 
help the entrepreneur to internalize behavioral norms in a particular network clique, and this 
maximizes obtaining of new technology and ideas. Knowledge diversity of alters eases up access 
to tangible resources such as private equity (Batjargal & Liu, 2004). For example, approaching a 
particular group of venture capitalists requires awareness of the investment preference and social 
habits of members. Being situated in networks composed of people who are different in their 
mentalities enables the entrepreneur to tailor her networking strategy and tactics towards a 
particular investor (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). Greater tangible resources including cash 
lead to successful product diversification (Hitt et al, 1997). Entrepreneurial brokerage between 
separated players generates effective acquisition, storage and retrieval of technological solutions 
when the entrepreneur relies on advice of alters who process information differently (Hargadon 
& Sutton, 1997).  
When the ego connects two contacts who did not know each other before and who are 
distant in their knowledge to design new products the outcome might be two extremes contingent 
upon how they were connected: success or failure. It may not work because social distance 
blocks communication and coordination, and knowledge distance hinders knowledge transfer. 
The key factor for successful use of diverse knowledge in triads is strong relationships between 
the ego and each alter (Granovetter, 1983). Common particularistic ties to the third person reduce 
social uncertainties that make triads transitive. Once players with diverse knowledge are linked 
by an influential third-party to create new applications, the results may enhance product 
diversification. The perception that network members are “experts” in different fields may create 
comfortable psychological atmosphere where alters exchange their views and learn from each 
other. This may increase the number of new product ideas available. 
Speedy product development enhances long-term performance. However, when speed is 
combined with persistent dense and homophilous networks, it turns into a liability, gradually   23
harming revenue growth. The isolated cliques, where entrepreneurs are situated, cut them off 
from the external world by blocking information flows on the latest competition, market demand 
and technological progress. A strong sense of social obligations and mutual commitment found 
in such networks encourages entrepreneurs to stick to the redundant ties over time. This 
perpetuates the vicious circle of over-embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). Coupling the over-
embeddedness in the clique where everybody knows the same thing with product development 
speed accelerates the venture’s revenue loss, because entrepreneurs learn to be fast in producing 
the wrong systems and applications that are not demanded, technologically backward, and of 
poor quality. 
Perceptual similarities directly influence product shipment in China as the result of the core 
cultural value for social and opinion harmony. In Russia, both educational and perceptual 
homogeneity reduces the average waiting time of product shipment. Thus, the real and imagined 
agreements push product development forward in the Russian context of extreme institutional 
and social upheavals (Hitt et al, 2004). 
The interaction effects of density, homophily, and product speed became negative and 
significant over time for the Russian firms. Combined deployment of the redundant networks and 
efficiency is harmful especially to those firms that operate in unstable environments where 
market changes occur at faster rates. Transacting with well-known actors and introducing 
products rapidly in unpredictable technical and market environments lead to revenue loss 
because entrepreneurs waste their resources fast. 
The mechanisms through which structural holes and knowledge heterophily enhance product 
diversity are more salient in Russia. The institutional turbulence reflected in more “chaotic” 
networking strategies of players enabled the Russian executives to recruit unconnected alters 
with heterogeneous background (Kharkhordin & Gerber, 1994). The Russian entrepreneurs 
create new applications and re-design “old” products for new customers by spanning various 
industry boundaries and geographic localities, as well as overcoming social and knowledge 
distances of players. The Russian entrepreneurs bridge different localities to harvest new product 
ideas and identify un-served market niches. 
The negative interaction effects of structural holes, heterophily, and product diversity turned 
into positive effects over three years for the Russian ventures. At early stages, sparse and 
heterogeneous networks combined with broad product strategy prevent the Russian managers to   24
communicate effectively with alters, coordinate their efforts, build trust, mobilize resources, 
integrate knowledge, and deliver software programs in a timely manner (Sedaitis 1998). The 
broad product scope spreads limited resources thinly across several segments. These factors 
affect revenues negatively at early stages. Once the Russian software ventures reach the 
threshold of revenue year 5, the liability of low-density, heterogeneous networks and product 
diversification turns into an asset that boosts revenues in the long term. Three mechanisms are at 
work here. Brokerage is a tested strategy (Sedaitis, 1998). When the Soviet distribution system 
collapsed, brokerage firms mushroomed in the country legitimizing brokerage as a strategy and 
encouraging the Russians to profit from playing off parties against one another. Transitivity 
functions in different ways than in China. To link two alters is time-consuming in Russia because 
of the traditional Russian distrust of unfamiliar persons, even if that person was recommended by 
a “trusted” third-party (Petrovskii, 1991). The initial cost of linking two parties therefore is high, 
and this is reflected in firm under-performance. However, once two sides endure the relationship 
for a certain time, parties are likely to cooperate. This affects positively outcome variables. 
Paradoxically, the mutual distrust and secrecy observed in the Russian triads keeps the Russian 
networks sparse and less homogenized over time. Product diversification spreads venture risks 
across various market segments. Thus, the Russian entrepreneurs who combine sparse and 
heterogeneous networks with product diversity are likely to outperform those executives whose 
networks are dense and homogeneous and product portfolio is narrow. 
To conclude, this study found that network structure and player attributes affect dependent 
variables in interactive ways. This is a confirmation of the player-structure duality of network 
theory (Burt, 1992). Networks do not “act”, but players with their attributes act and create values 
within the existing patterns of relationships among actors. The study also found direct effects of 
alter attributes on outcome variables. Although product development speed enhances revenue 
growth in the longer term, the interactive deployment of high-density, homogeneous networks 
and efficient product development harms revenue growth over time. The way in which network 
structure and composition influences outcome variables is contingent upon a country’s 
institutional and social peculiarities, i.e., China versus Russia. 
 I claim three contributions. First, this article makes a contribution to social network theory, 
by confirming the interactive effects of network structure and actor attributes on outcome 
variables. Second, the finding that revenue growth of new ventures is a function of the   25
combination of entrepreneurs’ social and knowledge resources, and product development, is a 
contribution to the entrepreneurship literature. Third, the evidence that the way in which 
entrepreneurs’ network structure and composition influences venture performance is different in 
China and Russia, contributes to the growing management literature on emerging markets. 
Several limitations should be discussed. This is a retrospective study, where the effects of 
current discussion networks were examined on the past performance of ventures. Therefore, 
there is an issue of causality between network variables and venture performance. The severity 
of this problem, however, is reduced by the fact that the respondents had relationships with most 
alters before they set up ventures. The software industries in China and Russia are young, and 
therefore, institutional, regulatory and market immaturity may have affected these results, 
although I assume that all the entrepreneurs are exposed to the same country conditions in each 
country to the same extent. The sample size is relatively small. The assumption that 14 market 
segments have similar product development cycles constitutes a shortcoming. The product 
diversification measurement is subjective, although this measurement suits the country and 
industry contexts. 
A research implication is that combined effects of network structure and knowledge 
characteristics of actors may be studied further at the inter-organizational level. For example, one 
could examine how structural closeness and distance interact with knowledge relatedness and 
distance at the inter-organizational level, and how they affect outcome variables in interactive 
ways. Complex models are required to explain revenue growth of young firms in developing 
countries. For instance, marketing strategy in parallel with entrepreneurs’ networks and product 
development may be incorporated in models that designed to explain revenue growth of new 
ventures over time. A practical implication is that entrepreneurs are advised to rely on cohesive 
networks at early stages, but restructure their networks as their ventures age and grow to generate 
sustainable opportunities.   26
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlations 
 
 Variables 
 
N M  S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Network  size  158 4.29 1.34        
2 Relationship 
duration 
157 4.92 3.53  .05 
     
3 Network  density  157 .42 .38 -.18* .14      
4 Structural  holes  157 2.63 3.21  .56** .14 -.42**     
5 Internal  ties  158 .73 .29 -.18* -.02  .40**  -.48**    
6 Education 
homophily 
158 .67 .28 -.14  .07  .13 -.17* .13 
 
7 Education 
heterophily 
158 .32 .28  .14  -.07 -.13 .17* -.13 -1** 
8 Perceived 
homophily 
158 3.18 .89  -.09  .09 .31**  -.25**  .32** .14 
9 Perceived 
heterophily 
158 1.82 .90  .08  -.09 -.31**  .25**  -.33**  -.16* 
10 Product 
development 
duration 
156 13.17  10.13  .13  .12  -.21**  .26**  -.21** -.18* 
11 Product  diversity  158 2.27 1.68  .30** .03 -.30**  .46**  -.24**  -.25** 
12  Revenue year two  142 12.81  23.23 -.12  -.12  .23** -.18*  .14  .09 
13 Revenue  year 
three 
83  8.60  11.09  -.11 -.16 .12 -.20 .07 .10 
14  Revenue year four  58  10.25  9.17 .01 -.29* .06 -.06 -.02 -.02 
15  Revenue year five  41  15.64  12.56  .02 -.29 -.07 .01 -.07 -.28 
16 Firm  age  159 3.33 1.44  .12 .25** -.13 .29** -.10  .15 
17 Firm  size  159  47.67  52.37  .15* -.06 -.15* .07  .04 .17* 
18 Ownership  159 .59 .49 -.08  .22** .15  .06 -.17* -.15 
19 Venture  capital  159 .13 .33 -.02 -.05 -.14 -.03 .01 -.06 
20 China  159  .48  .50 -.26**  -.26** .20* -.40**  .26** .24** 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Continued) 
 
 Variables 
 
7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 
8 Perceived 
homophily  -.14          
9 Perceived 
heterophily  .16* -.99**         
10 Product 
developmen
t duration 
.18* -.30**  .29** 
      
11 Product 
diversity  .25** -.27** .28** .43**       
12 Revenue 
year two  -.09 .18*  -.19*  -.19*  -.27**      
13 Revenue 
year three  -.10 .18 -.18  -.29**  -.34**  .62**     
14 Revenue 
year four  .02  .03 -.01 -.25 -.16 .33*  .69**    
15 Revenue 
year five  .28 -.13 .18 -.14 .21 -.08  .32*  .67**   
16 Firm  age  -.15  .01  -.01  .43**  .25**  -.06  -.02  -.28*  -.45** 
17  Firm  size -.17*  .03 -.04 .12 .05 .10 .16 .09 -.01 
18  Ownership .15 .09 -.07 .05 -.01 .04 .06 -.05 -.08 
19 Venture 
capital  .06 -.14 .13 .02 .03 .11 .03 -.06 .11 
20 China  -.24**  .10  -.11  -.43** -.55**  .30**  .40**  .26*  -.07 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Continued) 
 
    16 17 18 19 
17  Firm  size  .31**     
18 Ownership  -.09 -.28**     
19 Venture 
capital  .00 .17* -.09   
20  China  -.29** .14  -.18* .18* 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA of Chinese and Russian Samples 
 
   China 
 
Russia ANOVA 
model 
  
 
N Means  S.D. N Means S.D.  F 
1 Network  size  76  3.92  1.45  82  4.63  1.13  11.82*** 
2 Relationship  duration  75  3.95 2.57 82  5.80  4.04 11.42*** 
3 Network  density  75  .50  .45  82  .34  .29  6.76* 
4 Structural  holes  75  1.26  2.61  82  3.87  3.21  30.77*** 
5 Internal  ties  76  .81  .30  82  .66  .26  11.34*** 
6 Education  homophily  76  .74  .33  82  .60  .21  9.70** 
7 Education  heterophily  76  .25  .33  82  .39  .21  9.70** 
8 Perceived  homophily  76  3.28  1.02  82  3.09  .75  1.80 
9 Perceived  heterophily  76 1.71  1.02  82 1.93  .76  2.25 
10 Product  development 
duration  76  8.72 8.71 80 17.41 9.59  34.89*** 
11  Product  diversity  76 1.31 .73 82 3.16 1.82  67.75*** 
12  Revenue year two  64  20.59  27.21  78  6.42  17.06  14.31*** 
13  Revenue year three  37  13.51  13.44  46  4.65  6.61  15.38*** 
14  Revenue year four  13  14.69  12.76  45  8.97  7.54  4.13* 
15  Revenue year five  6  13.33  15.05  35  16.02  12.30  .23 
16 Firm  age  77  2.89  1.32  82  3.74  1.43  15.29*** 
17  Firm  size  77  55.48  54.67 82  40.34 49.33  3.36¶ 
18 Ownership  77  .50  .50  82  .68  .46  5.24* 
19 Venture  capital  77  .19  .39  82  .07  .26  5.22* 
 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001   33
Table 3. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Product Development (N=159) 
 
 Product  development 
duration 
Product diversity 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Controls      
Firm age  .34***  .34***  .03  .06 
Firm  size  .11 .11 .07 .11 
Ownership .07  .08  -.07  -.03 
Venture  capital  .01 .01 .08 .07 
China -.24*  -.24*  -.44***  -.37*** 
      
Predictors      
      
Network density  -.01  -.11     
Education homophily  -.13¶  -.18*     
Perceived homophily  -.28***  -.31***     
      
Structural holes      .22**  .01¶ 
Education heterophily      .11¶  .02 
Perceived heterophily      .13*  .06 
      
Interactions      
      
Network density X Education homophily X 
Perceived homophily 
 .16    
      
Structural holes X Education heterophily X 
Perceived heterophily 
    .45*** 
      
Model F 
 
11.38*** 10.22*** 14.03*** 17.19*** 
Adjusted R square 
 
.35  .35 .4 .48 
 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
   34
Table 4. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Revenue Growth 
 
 Revenue 
year 2 
Revenue 
year 3 
Revenue 
year 4 
Revenue 
year 5 
Revenue 
year 2 
Revenue 
year 3 
Revenue 
year 4 
Revenue 
year 5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Controls          
          
Firm  age  .05 .21¶ -.28 -.47  .02  .16 -.23¶  -.37* 
Firm  size  .07 .13 .18 .05 .07 .13 .18 .02 
Ownership  .12 .17¶ .01 -.04 .11  .15 -.02 -.04 
Venture  capital  .08 -.05 -.13 .01 .07 -.03 -.1  .25 
China  .24*  .42** .16  -.05 .25* .39*  .2  .01 
          
Predictors          
          
Density X Education 
homophily X Perceived 
homophily  
.11  .01  -.18  -.19      
Product development 
speed 
.02  .18  .27  .38¶      
Structural holes X 
Education heterophily X 
Perceived heterophily 
     -.11  -.06  .33  .08 
Product  diversity       -.03  -.22  .19  .13 
          
Interactions          
          
Density X Education 
homophily X Perceived 
homophily X Product 
development speed 
.15  .03  -.07  -.32*      
Structural holes X 
Education heterophily X 
Perceived heterophily X 
Product diversity 
     -.25  .11  .11  .34 
          
N 
 
142  83 58 41  142  83 58 41 
Model F 
 
3.09* 3.10** 1.63  2.23*  2.9*  3.1*  1.4  1.89¶ 
Adjusted R Square 
 
.10 .17 .08  .2  .1  .16 .06 .15 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001   35
Table 5. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Product Development of Chinese and 
Russian Firms 
 
 Product  development 
duration 
Product diversity 
 China  Russia  China  Russia 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
        
Controls      
Firm age  .17  .53***  -.19  .14 
Firm size  .1  .25*  .26¶  .13 
Ownership .16  -.05  -.03  -.08 
Venture capital  .11  -.17¶  .25*  .01 
        
Predictors and Interactions      
        
Network density  -.12  -.06     
Education homophily  -.16  -.25¶     
Perceived homophily  -.41**  -.23*     
        
Network density X Education homophily X 
Perceived homophily 
.15 .11     
        
Structural holes      .04  .03 
Education heterophily      -.01  .08 
Perceived heterophily      -.01  .11 
        
Structural holes X Education heterophily X 
Perceived homophily 
   -.07  .42* 
        
N 
 
76 80 76 82 
Model F 
 
2.2*  6.37*** 1.3 5.66*** 
Adjusted R square 
 
.12 .35 .03 .31 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
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Table 6. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Revenue Growth of Chinese and Russian Firms 
  Rev. year 2  Rev. year 
3 
Rev. 
y. 4 
Rev. 
y. 5 
Rev. year 2  Rev. year 
3 
Rev. 
y. 4 
Rev. 
y. 5 
 Ch  Rus  Ch  Rus  Rus  Rus  Ch Rus Ch  Rus  Rus  Rus 
  M 1  M 2  M 3  M 4  M 5  M 6  M 7  M 8  M9 M 
10 
M 
11 
M 
12 
Firm  age  .33*  -.31* .48* -.29 -.52  -
.59**
.39* -
.41**
.5* -.26 -.48 -.47 
Firm  size  .08  -.01 .09 .07 -.1 -.21 .06 -.05 .07  .09 -.05 -.2 
Ownership  .06  .27* .23 .33  .1  -.11 .15 .21* .25  .28¶ .05 -.1 
Venture 
capital 
.15 .07  -.04  .06  .07 .14  .11  .15 -
.05 
.06 .07 .11 
Predictors                     
Density  .34* -.11 .17  -.05  -.05 -.11             
Education 
homophily 
.02 .13  -.03  .25  .04  -.03             
Perceived 
homophily 
.21 .13  .15  .06  -.04  .01             
Product 
dev. speed 
-.11 .07 .22  .01  -.01 .15             
Structural 
holes 
         -.09  .25  -
.05 
-.01 .09  .10 
Education 
heterophily 
         -.03  -.06  .05  -.13  .03  -.00 
Perceived 
heterophily 
         -.15  -.07  -
.12 
.01 .05 -.06 
Product 
diversity 
          .01  .02  .02  -.11  -.25  -.13 
Interactions                     
Density x 
Education 
homophily 
x Perceived 
homophily 
x Product 
dev. speed 
-.13 .11  -.26  .04  -.01  -.26¶             
Structural 
holes x Ed. 
heterophily 
x Per. 
heterophily 
x Product 
diversity 
          .1  -.39*  .1  -.14  .08  .51¶ 
N  64  78 37  46 45 35 64 78 37  46 45 35 
Model  F  2.02* 2.66* 1.19 1.04 1.48  2.7*  1.16 3.4*  .97 1.26 1.72  3* 
Adjusted R 
square 
.12  .16 .04  .01 .09 .31 .02 .21  -
.01 
.05 .12 .34 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. ¶p< 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001   
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